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SUPERIOR OFFICERS IN REVIEW OF DEPORTATION ORDER
Plaintiff deportee brought an action against the District Di-
rector of Immigration and Naturalization seeking a declaration
that a deportation order issued against him by the Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization was invalid, alleging a lack of
due process in the hearing and asking injunctive relief against
the enforcement of the order. The defendant district director
moved to dismiss the action for lack of an indispensable party.
Held: the commissioner is not an indispensable party to an action
to review an order of deportation.'
The term "indispensable party" is used in the federal courts
to describe a party without whom the court cannot proceed.2 The
first case involving the question of indispensability of superior
governmental officers in an action against a subordinate was
Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith.3 That case held the superior
officer indispensable on the ground that the purpose of the suit
was to control his action. Subsequent to this decision many cases
were decided without raising the question.4 Twenty-seven years
later the United States Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine
I Pedriero v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. granted
sub nom. Shaughnessy v. Pedriero, 99 L. Ed. 77 (1954). This note does
not discuss the other question raised in the case, i.e., the propriety of a
declaratory judgment action to review the validity of a deportation order.
2 Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U.S. 199 (1902). Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b), failure to join an indispensable party requires dis-
missal of the action. United States v. Washington Institute of Technology,
138 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1943).
3 165 U.S. 28 (1897) (action to require the Secretary of Interior to
issue a land patent and to enjoin his subordinate from taking possession
of the land).
4Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922) (action to enjoin a local post-
master from enforcing a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (action to enjoin United States
Game Warden from enforcing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and regula-
tions issued in pursuance thereof by the Secretary of Agiculture); Swigart
v. Baker, 229 U.S. 187 (1913) (action to enjoin reclamation officers from
cutting off irrigation water supply); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194
U.S. 497 (1904) (action to enjoin local postmaster from enforcing fraud
order issued by the Postmaster General); American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902) (action to enjoin local post-
master from enforcing fraud order issued by Postmaster General); Magruder
v. Belle Fourche Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 219 Fed. 72 (8th Cir. 1914)
(actin to enjoin manager and project engineer of irrigation project from
collecting allegedly illegal charges). In none of these cases was the
question of indispensability of the superior officer raised.
CASENOTES
in Gnerich v. Rutter,5 followed shortly by Webster v. Fall., These
three cases were ignored in Colorado v. Toll7 which allowed the
action to proceed without the superior officer, holding that he was
not indispensable. Irreconcilable conflict followed, with courts
following both lines of authority.s Williams v. Fanning" unsuc-
cessfully attempted to settle the controversy by ruling that the
superior is not indispensable
... if the decree granted will effectively grant the relief desired
by expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the
court.1O
Efforts to apply this rule have resulted in a conflict in deportation
order cases.11
The principal argument advanced in favor of requiring the
presence of the superior in actions to review deportation orders
is that if the district director alone is made a party to the action,
neither the commissioner nor directors in other districts will be
bound by a decree in favor of the deportee. Should the deportee
leave the district in which he brought the action, he could still be
deported by the district director of another district under the
5 265 U.S. 388 (1924) (action for injunction against a local prohibi-
tion officer to restrain him from enforcing a regulation issued by the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue restricting the issuance of liquor manu-
facturing permits was dismissed on the ground that the subordinate acted
only under the direction of the commissioner who was therefore an in-
dispensable party).
6266 U.S. 507 (1925) (action against local Indian agent to require
payment of funds was dismissed on the ground that the power and res-
ponsibility for making the payment was lodged with the Secretary of the
Interior).
7 268 U.S. 228 (1925) (action to enjoin a national park superintendent
from carrying out regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior).
S See cases collected in 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 19.16, n. 8 (2d ed.
1948).
9 332 U.S. 490 (1947) (action to enjoin a local postmaster from en-
forcing a fraud order issued against the plaintiff by the Postmaster Gen-
eral).
10 Id. at 494.
11 The superior officer was held indispensable in the following cases.
Rodriguez v. Landon, 212 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1954); Belzaro v. Zimmer-
man, 200 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1952); Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir. 1952); Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 184
F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1950); Podovinnikoff v. Miller, 179 F.2d 937 (3d Cir.
1950); Corona v. Landon, 111 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Calif. 1953); Birns v.
Commissioner, 103 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Medalha v. Shaugh-
nessy, 102 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Contra: Navarro v. Landon, 106
F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Calif. 1952). See Ragni v. Butterfield, 115 F. Supp.
953, 955 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Torres v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.
Calif. 1953).
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same deportation order.12 Therefore, effective and adequate re-
lief can be granted only if the commissioner is made a party to the
action. 13
In the instant case it is pointed out that only the district di-
rector is authorized to issue the warrant of deportation necessary
to remove the alien from this country.14 Therefore, a decree in
favor of the deportee against the director alone will grant all the
relief desired if the deportee is willing to stay within the district
in which he brought the action. If the commissioner is to be
made a party to the action, it must be brought in Washington,
D.C., the place of his official and actual residence.' 5 Since many
of the aliens bringing such actions are persons of limited means,
the travel expense incident to bringing suit in Washington, D.C.
would, in many cases, be virtually "a denial of the right to bring
suit." 1 It has been suggested that the government is needlessly
concerned over the efficacy of the plaintiff's remedy. He may be
perfectly content to remain in the district in which he brought
suit.'7
Some courts which have held the commissioner or the at-
torney general indispensable in an action to review a deportation
order recognize the hardship of the holding upon indigent aliens,
but suggest that the proper remedy for such defects in the ad-
ministration of justice lies with Congress, rather than with the
courts.s It would seem that since this hardship would have a
12 In National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F.2d
66, 67 (1936), Judge L. Hand suggests that if it is held that the superior
is not indispensable in an action to enjoin the carrying out of his orders
by a subordinate, the subordinate might be left in a cross-fire. He admits,
however. that this is "...the only reason we have been able to conjure
up." This "cross-fire" argument was deemed immaterial in Williams v.
Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 494 (1947).
13Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1952); Corona v.
Landon, 111 F. Supp. 191, 196 (S.D. Calif. 1953); Birns v. Commissioner,
103 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
14 3 Code Fed. Regs. § 243.1 (1952); Pedriero v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d
768, 769, 770 (2d Cir. 1954).
15 Except in cases of diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff must sue in
the district in which all the defendants reside, 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1952).
10 Ragni v. Butterfield, 115 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
17 At any rate, the superior officer could intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24. This would also serve to protect any interest that the superior might
have in the action.
lSVaz v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd. 208
F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1953); Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280, 282 (3d Cir.
1952).

